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Abstract
The European Cyber Crime Centre, EC3, established under the umbrella of Europol, started operations 
on January 1 2013. It is to act as the focal point in the fight against cybercrime in the European Union. 
Using a “shared, cross-community approach” the EC3 is concluding partnerships with member 
states, European agencies, international partners and the private sector. This article describes the 
coming about of EC3 and its efforts to address cybercrime. Furthermore, the article is an attempt 
to assess the growing role of the European law enforcement community on the European security 
scene, this not least in view of the EC3’s mandate to conclude strategic agreements with a fairly 
high degree of autonomy.
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 1. Introduction
At the end of 2010, the European Commission announced its intention to establish 
a European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) within the existing EU structure as part of the 
internal security strategy of the EU (The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action). 
Being the new flagship of Europol (the European Law Enforcement Agency), the EC3 
is to act as the focal point in the fight against cybercrime in the European Union. 
Also the Stockholm Program: “An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens”1, emphasizes cyber-crime and network information security as priorities.
As for Europol, this agency became a reality with the Maastricht Treaty on Febru-
ary 17, 1992 in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in order to deal with the 
so-called security deficit caused by new insecurities such as organized crime, illegal 
1 The Stockholm Program is a five-year plan with guidelines for justice and home affairs of the 
Member States of the European Union for the years 2010-2014.
Trine Thygesen Vendius
152 EJPS 3(2) / 2015
drugs, illegal immigration and terrorism (Buzan et al., 1998; Bigo, 1996). In this 
context, the establishment of the EC3 as part of the EU Internal Security Strategy 
can be seen as a result of the growing “securitization” of cybercrime thus being 
articulated the new threat to European security.
This article seeks to address a rather underexplored question in relation to this 
development, namely the growing role of an organization such as the EC3 and its 
ability to enter into arrangements with third parties. In this respect, the growing 
role of the European law enforcement has not been addressed much in academia. 
As pointed out by Wessel (Wessel, 2008: 152), it is a fact that by the beginning of 
2007, the EU had become part of some 90 international agreements as part of the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). However, when it comes to agencies 
involved in third pillar issues (Justice and Home Affairs), their external relations 
activities are rather underexplored (Ott, 2008: 518). This despite the fact that agen-
cies increasingly seem to cooperate with third state’s authorities, international 
programmes and organizations (Ott et al., 2014: 88-89). In this respect, Europol is 
assumed to be one of the most significant actors in the European internal security 
regime (Mounier, 2009: 583). This is also the case, when observing the EC3, the 
European Cybercrime Center, being situated within Europol, the law enforcement 
agency of the European Union.
 2. Defining Cybercrime
Unlike the case with Europol, there seems to be no major event that led to the 
establishment of the EC3. As pointed out by Buono (2012), it is difficult to indicate 
the precise date when the European Union decided to address the problem of 
cybercrime (Buono, 2012: 334).
On 23 November 2001 the Convention of cybercrime, also known as the Budapest 
Convention, was agreed upon, being the first international treaty addressing internet 
and computer crime. This convention, which entered into force in July 2004, seeks to 
harmonize national laws, improve investigative techniques and increase cooperation 
among nations and is so far the only binding international treaty on the subject 
which has been adopted to date. On a European level the Council Framework Deci-
sion 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems was adopted in 2005.
However, despite a growing focus on cybercrime in recent years – both in Europe 
and globally – there still lacks a single definition of cybercrime on a European 
level. In fact, it could be argued, that there are almost as many terms to describe 
cybercrime as there are cybercrimes and that a classification ought to distinguish 
between existing offenses committed in new ways and “true cybercrimes”, e.g. 
offenses against computers and networks (Clough, 2010: 9-11). In this respect, 
such a definition can be found in the 2007 EU Commission’s communication 
from 2007 dedicated to computer-related crimes has defined cybercrime as fol-
lows: “criminal acts committed using electronic communications, networks and 
information systems or against such networks and systems” (European Commission 
communication, 2007a).
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In other words, the term “cybercrime” covers both new crimes specific to the 
Internet, e.g. attacks against information systems or phishing (fake bank websites to 
solicit passwords enabling access to victims’ bank accounts) and so-called “Internet 
facilitated” crimes (or computer assisted crimes), e.g. crimes where computers used 
in an online environment are used as tools to commit more traditional crimes. 
These crimes are for example fraud, the dissemination of illegal content such as 
child sexual abuse material or incitements to violence on the Internet.
 3. The Establishment of EC3 – a New, Innovative Step
The establishment of a European Cyber Crime Centre, EC3, was a first important 
step on a European level to address the growing threat from cybercrime. The EC3 
became a reality shortly after the European Commission’s proposal to establish a 
European Cyber Crime Center in 2010 as part of the EU Internal Security Strategy. 
The proposal was followed by a feasibility study funded under the ISEC Program 
(Internal Security Fund, the Prevention of and fight against crime) in the beginning 
of 2012, delivered by RAND Europe.2 The RAND study served as the basis of the 
communication on a European Cyber Crime Centre re-commending the establish-
ment of a European Cyber Crime Centre to be set up within Europol. Soon after, 
on 28 March 2012, the European Commission adopted a communication titled 
“Tackling crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cyber Crime Centre”. 
On July 1, 2012 the EC3 Implementation Team started its activities, and on January 
1, 2013 the EC3 was live and operational with a staff of 64 people employed for 
the purpose of assisting EU Member States in the fight against cybercrime in the 
European Union.3
Less than a year after it became operational, the EC3 was already going strong. 
According to the first annual report of EC3, several analytical products had been 
produced focusing on the dark net and deep web, including bitcoins and the digital 
underground economy. In addition several knowledge products had been produced 
for the Member States’ competent authorities, for instance the so-called ransom 
ware report and action plan, the strategic assessment on commercial exploitation 
of children online and the situation report on payment card fraud in the EU.
It should be mentioned, that also Interpol, the world’s largest international police 
organization with 190 member countries, has set up a cybercrime centre, Interpol 
Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI), in Singapore. The centre started its opera-
tions in 2015 marking the transition of global policing into the digital age4. This 
step was eventually triggered as a result of Europol’s innovative effort to tackle 
cybercrime in a more systematic manner, the latter being first mover in the area on 
a European level with the establishment of the EC3.
2 RAND Europe is an independent not-for-profit research institute whose mission is to help improve 
policy and decision-making through research and analysis.
3 According to (now former) Head of EC3, Troels Oerting, telephone interview, 1 November 2013.
4 INTERPOL’s website, International gathering marks inauguration of INTERPOL Global Complex 
for Innovation, http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2015/N2015-039
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On 25 September 2013 Europol and Interpol held their first joint Cybercrime 
Conference with the aim of enhancing international cooperation to tackle existing 
and future challenges in policing cyber space5. The borderless nature of cybercrime 
requires a global alliance in the fight against cybercrime. As stated in the first IOCTA 
report (Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Executive Report 2014), 
law enforcement should concentrate on pro-active, intelligence-led approaches to 
combatting cybercrime through existing platforms such as the EC3 and Interpol’s 
Global Complex for Innovation.
However, as the report also has stated, tackling cybercrime demands a differ-
ent approach including new partners to be integrated into existing cooperation 
frameworks as it is the case with the EC3. This will be elaborated in the following.
 4. A Shared, Cross-Community Approach: the Outreach Function
Initially it can be noted (when examining Europol’s website), that the main func-
tions of the EC3 are primarily focused on three areas: Cybercrimes committed 
by organized groups (particularly those generating large criminal profits such as 
online fraud); cybercrimes which cause serious harm to the victim (such as online 
child sexual exploitation) and finally, cybercrimes (including cyber-attacks) affect-
ing critical infrastructure and information systems in the European Union.6 As 
further stated on Europol’s website, the EC3 serves as the central hub for criminal 
information and intelligence, supports Member States’ operations and investigations 
by means of operational analysis, coordination and expertise and provides a variety 
of strategic analysis. Furthermore, the EC3 supports training and capacity building, 
provides highly specialized technical and digital forensic support and represents 
the EU law enforcement community in areas of common interest (R&D require-
ments, internet governance, and policy development). Finally, the EC3 establishes 
a so-called comprehensive outreach function connecting cybercrime related law 
enforcement authorities with the private sector, academia and other non-law enforce-
ment partners. This outreach function together with the mandate to represent the 
EU law enforcement community of the EC3 will be further discussed below. 
In this respect, according to a study from the European Parliament, we are now 
dealing with a “triangular diplomacy between states, companies and the inter-state 
system in the global regulation of the internet” (European Parliament, Study 2012). 
This has been further been explained by the EC3, as follows: “Since cyberspace 
and the internet’s infrastructure are for the most part owned by the private sector, 
only a shared, cross-community approach will bring enduring results in the fight 
against cybercrime” (Frequently asked questions, MEMO/12/221). What here is 
interesting is that the EC3 is in charge of a so-called ”outreach function”. This 
outreach function both develops and maintains partnerships that can contribute to 
the EU Member States response to cybercrime in order to facilitate such cooperation, 
5 Europol’s website, Europol-Interpol cybercrime conference steps up policing in cyberspace, https://
www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-interpol-cybercrime-conference-steps-policing-cyberspace
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strengthen partnerships among various sectors, including the development of 
forums and projects and public private partnerships at national and international 
levels. The outreach function further includes the ”proactive identification of new 
partners where required and cooperation with law enforcement agencies, EU 
institutions, international organizations, private industry, the public sector and 
academia”.6
Thus, the EC3 concludes cooperation agreements with key actors that can con-
tribute to the EU Member States response to cybercrime. In this respect, the term 
“Internet Governance” is to be understood as “the development and regulation of 
the Internet through shared principles, norms and programs“ since the Internet 
“is governed through a multi-stakeholder approach, in a continuous and complex 
process“.7
It could be argued, that in this way, the Internet is being framed as a sort of a 
”wild west” with reference to the borderless nature of the Internet and the lack 
of regulation in the field. As a consequence, the EC3 has provided itself with the 
task of a diplomatic role ensuring that common principles and norms are created 
through the deployment of a shared, cross-community approach when engaging 
in partnerships with Member States, private parties and third countries. In other 
words, what the EC3 itself has labeled its ”outreach function”. What further can 
be observed in this context is how the European law enforcement community 
gradually has gained the role of diplomatic entrepreneurs providing them with a 
high level of autonomy when it comes to concluding strategic partnerships in the 
area of cyber security.
A good example is Russia. Already half a year after the establishment of EC3 – in 
June 2013 – the Russian Federation officially visited EC3 for the first time in order 
to establish the basis for a future operational agreement. In this respect, Mr. Troels 
Oerting, (now former) Head of EC3, stated that the visit was “… an important step 
for the EU law enforcement community to engage in a more direct cooperation 
with the Russian Federation on cybercrime and cyber protection”.8
In other words, we see that European Law Enforcement is entering in direct 
negotiations with third countries, in this case a superpower such as the Russian 
federation, outside the normal diplomatic framework of national state leaders. 
To put it into perspective: Simultaneously, Barack Obama, America’s president 
was hosting his Chinese counterpart at an informal summit aimed at enhancing 
cooperation on cybersecurity.
6 Europol’s website, outreach and cooperation, https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/outreach-and-
cooperation
7 Europol’s website, cyber community engagement, https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/cyber-
community-engagement
8 Europol’s website, First official visit of the Russian Federation to the European Cybercrime Centre, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_news/first-official-visit-russian-federation-european-cyber-
crime-centre
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 5. The Growing Importance of Law Enforcement – a New World Order?
The situation described above underlines a development, which academia has 
labelled “a new global policing architecture” (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012); describing 
also a situation where the practice of policing has been unhitched in various ways 
from the nation-state and resituated within “networks” of actors operating across 
national frontiers (Loader, 2002: 291).
And we see a new world order emerging, one which consists of global governance 
(Slaughter, 2005) and where various agents such as government officials, police 
investigators, judges etc. exchange information and cooperate across national 
borders to tackle crime, terrorism and international interactions. This complex 
global web of “government networks” challenges the notion of state sovereignty. 
But as Slaughter has put it, the state is not disappearing. On the contrary, it is 
disaggregating into separate, functionally distinct parts which are networking with 
their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitute a new 
trans-governmental order (Slaughter, 1997: 184). As Slaughter argues, this is not 
a collection of nation states that communicate through presidents, prime minis-
ters, foreign ministers, the UN etc. On the contrary, police investigators, financial 
regulators, judges and legislators have taken over the role of government officials.
 6. The Legal Basis for Concluding Agreements
As mentioned, the EC3 has been set up under the umbrella of Europol. Thus, the 
legal basis for the conclusion of agreements is to be found in the current 2009 
Europol Council Decision, which authorizes Europol “to be able to conclude agree-
ments and working arrangements with Union or Community institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies in order to increase mutual effectiveness in combating serious 
forms of crime which come within the respective competence of both parties and to 
avoid the duplication of work”. Under the current legal regime, strategic cooperation 
agreements generally provide for the exchange of all information (operational, 
strategic or technical) with the exception of personal data.
As stated in article 23(1) on “Relations with third States and organizations”, 
Europol may establish and maintain cooperative relations with:
(a) third States;
(b) organisations such as:
(i) international organisations and their subordinate bodies governed by public 
law;
(ii) other bodies governed by public law which are set up by, or on the basis 
of, an agreement between two or more States; and
(iii) the International Criminal Police Organisations (Interpol).
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According to article 23(2), such agreements may concern the exchange of opera-
tional, strategic or technical information including personal data and classified 
information.
In principle Europol is accountable to the EU Member States through the Coun-
cil members and the Europol Management Board. According to the wording of 
Article 218 TFEU, the power to conclude international agreements for the Union 
is conferred upon the Council (Ott et al., 2014: 94). As pointed out by Busonic et 
al. (2013), the conclusion of Europol agreements with third countries, other EU 
bodies and international organizations illustrating Europol’s unprecedented powers 
was made subject to control by the Council, and hence the director’s autonomy 
on these issues was significantly circumscribed. Thus the director cannot start 
negotiations or sign an agreement without the Council’s approval (Busonic et al., 
2013: 77). Enhanced control over Europol by the European Parliament and judicial 
control by the European Court of Justice is furthermore provided for in the 2009 
Europol decision in order to ensure that Europol remains a fully accountable and 
transparent organization. As set out in Article 218 TFEU and depending on the kind 
of the international agreement, the Council would adopt the decision concluding 
the agreement after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament or after 
consulting it.
In this respect, it has been claimed that European integration has eroded the 
role of national parliaments in European decision-making to some extent; these 
agreements are hardly subject to democratic control neither through national 
parliaments nor the European Parliament, the latter having no real powers in 
deciding legislation affecting the powers of Europol. In fact, these agreements 
are barely known or debated outside the European Law Enforcement community. 
Which leaves European Law Enforcement with a rather high level of autonomy to 
act on the diplomatic arena on behalf of the EU Member States. In this respect 
Member States are quite concerned and need further clarifications as regards the 
future of Europol’s relations with third countries (Discussion paper on Europol’s 
agreements with third countries, 17, September 2013).
 7. States Matter versus People Matter – the Proposal for a New Regulation on 
Europol
The legal framework for Europol is about to be changed in accordance with the 
Treaty of Lisbon – which provides for a new legal basis for Europol. On 27 March 
2013, the Commission published a proposal for a ‘Regulation on the European Police 
Office’ (Europol). Article 88 and Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union are the legal bases for the proposal. The new regulation 
will eventually replace the current Europol decision. In the proposal for a Europol 
regulation, the establishment of a European Cyber Crime Centre is provided for in 
article 4(I) as part of Europol’s tasks which include the ambition:
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(l) to develop Union centres of specialised expertise for combating certain types 
of crime falling under Europol’s objectives, in particular the European Cybercrime 
Centre.
In addition, the new Europol regulation is to provide for the following:
1. To establish Europol as a hub for information exchange between law enforce-
ment authorities in the Member States
2. To set up a robust data protection regime.
What triggered the need for a Europol regulation was not least to impose the EU 
Member States the obligation to supply Europol with information. As stated in the 
Commission staff’s working document accompanying the proposed regulation 
on Europol, the EU Member States do not provide Europol with all the necessary 
information to fight serious cross-border crime. As a result, Europol cannot be 
fully effective. As the common saying about Europol goes: “Europol is what the 
states make of it”.
Meanwhile the EC3 seems to be a success in its own right. This is not least due 
to the (now former) Head of EC3, Troels Oerting, a trained police officer from Den-
mark. People working closely with him have described him as “the architect behind 
EC3”9 and the absolute driving force of EC3, being both “extremely charismatic” 
and “very innovative and dynamic”.10 As a former Danish Europol liaison officer 
puts it: “One should not underestimate the importance of who is in charge. People 
matter”.11 In this respect Bowling & Sheptycki (2012) distinguish between eight 
archetypal global policing agents: The technician, the diplomat, the entrepreneur, 
the public relations’ expert, the legal ace, the spy, the field-operator and the enforcer 
(Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012: 87-94). Oerting, who was nominated “Most Influential 
People in Security 2013” by the American “Security Magazine” in November 2013 is 
now employed by UK Bank Barclays, and in June 2015, Barclays and the EC3 signed 
a public/private sector information sharing agreement (SC Magazine, Further 
public/private cooperation as EC3 teams up with Barclays).
 8. Conclusion
In this article I have sought to outline some observations related to the 
EC3, Europol’s Cybercrime Centre, and its agreements with third parties 
as part of a growing trend, where European Law Enforcement increas-
ingly has become an important player on the European security scene. 
In this respect I have elaborated on the so-called “outreach” function of the EC3 
involving a “shared, cross-community approach” as part of what has been labelled 
a “triangular diplomacy between states, companies and the inter-state system”. 
This outreach function connecting “cybercrime related law enforcement authorities 
9 Interview with former head of Danish desk at Europol, December 5, 2013.
10 Author’s conversations with representatives from Europol during visits to Europol, the EC3 
and CEPOL, The European Police Academy as part of a 3 year PhD dissertation on Europol and 
Cybercrime (2011-2014).
11 Interview with former Danish Europol Liaison Officer, December 5, 2013.
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with the private sector, academia and other non-law enforcement partners”12 raises 
questions related to national sovereignty. Not least in an era of global governance 
where – as framed by Bowling & Sheptycki (2012) – “police power has begun to 
fly from its original nesting place within the nation-state-system” (Bowling & 
Sheptycki, 2012: 87-94).
Bibliography
Bigo, D. (1996). Polices en reseaux, L’expérience européenne. Presses de Sciences Po.
Bowling, B. & Sheptycki, J. (2012). Global Policing. Sage Publications.
Buono, L. (2012). Gearing up the Fight against Cybercrime in the European Union: 
A new set of rules and the establishment of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3). 
New Journal of European Criminal Law, 3( 3-4), 332-343.
Busonic, M., Curtin, D. & Groenleer, M. (2013). Agency growth between autonomy 
and accountability: the European Police Office as a ’living institution’. In B. Rittber-
ger & A. Wonka (Eds.), Agency Governance in the EU. Routledge, 70-87.
Buzan, B., Waever, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security. A New Framework For Analysis. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Clough, J. (2010). Principles of Cybercrime. Cambridge University Press.
Discussion paper on Europol’s agreements with third countries, Brussels 17 Sep-
tember 2013, Council of the Europen Union. Retrieved from: http://register.con-
silium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013702%202013%20INIT, (accessed on 
14 September 2015).
European Commission (2013). Commission Staff Working Document, impact as-
sessment on adapting the European police Office’s legal framework with the Lisbon 
Treaty, Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation and Training (Europol) and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/
JHA and 2005/681/JHA, Brussels, 27.3.2013, SWD(2013) 98 final, Part 1, pp. 8-14.
European Commission (2007a). Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a 
general policy on the fight against cyber crime, COM/2007/0267 final.
European Commission (2007b). Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions, “Towards a general 
policy on the fight against cybercrime”, Brussels, 22.5.2007,COM(2007) 267 final.
European Commission (2012). Communication from the Commission to the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament, “Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing 
a European Cybercrime Centre”, Brussels, 28.3.2012, COM(2012) 140 final.
12 Europol website, Combating Cybercrime in a Digital Age, https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3
Trine Thygesen Vendius
160 EJPS 3(2) / 2015
Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23.XI.2001.
Council of Europe website, http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/rule-of-law/cybercrime.
Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police 
Office (Europol).
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against 
information systems, OJ L 069, 16/03/2005 p. 0067 – 0071.
EC3 First Year Report, 2013.
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department 
C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Study 2012, Fighting cybercrime and 
protecting privacy in the cloud.
Europol-Interpol (2013). Europol-Interpol cybercrime conference steps up policing 
in cyberspace, 25 September 2013. Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.
eu/content/europol-interpol-cybercrime-conference-steps-policing-cyberspace (ac-
cessed on 14 January 2015).
Europol’s website, Cyber Community engagement. Retrieved from: https://www.
europol.europa.eu/ec3/cyber-community-engagement (accessed on 27 July 2015).
Europol’s website, First official visit of the Russian Federation to the European 
Cyber Crime Centre. Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_news/
first-official-visit-russian-federation-european-cybercrime-centre (accessed on 27 
July 2015).
IOCTA, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Executive Report 2014.
INTERPOL’s website, International gathering marks inauguration of INTERPOL 
Global Complex for Innovation, 13 April 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.interpol.
int/News-and-media/News/2015/N2015-039 (accessed on 27 July 2015).
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union: An open, safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 
7.2.2013, JOIN (2013) 1 final.
Loader, I. (2002). Governing European Policing: some problems and prospects. 
Policing and Society, 12(4), 291-305.
MEMO/12/221, Brussels, 28 March 2012, Frequently Asked Questions: the new 
European Cybercrime Centre. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_MEMO-12-221_en.htm (accessed on 17 August 2015).
Mounier, G. (2002). Europol: A New Player in the EU External Policy Field? Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 10(4), 582-602.
Europol’s Cybercrime Centre (EC3)
Maklu 161
Ott, A. (2002). EU Regulatory Agencies in EU External Relations: Trapped in a 
Legal Minefield Between European and External Law. European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 13, 515-540.
Ott, A., Vos, E. & Coman-Kund, F. (2014). European Agencies on the Global Scene. 
In M. Everson, C. Monda & E. Vos (Eds.), European Agencies in between Institutions 
and Member States. Wolters Kluwer, 87-117.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) 
and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA, Brussels, 27.3.2013, 
COM(2013) 173 final, 2013/0091 (COD).
SC Magazine, Further public/private cooperation as EC3 teams up with Barclays, 
Retrieved from: http://www.scmagazineuk.com/further-publicprivate-cooperation-
as-ec3-teams-up-with-barclays/article/423594/ (accessed on 12 October 2015).
Slaughter, A.M. (2004). A New World Order. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Slaughter, A.M. (1997). The Real New World Order. Foreign Affairs, September/
October, 76(5), 183-197.
The Stockholm Program: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens, OJ C 115, 4.5.2010.
Wessel, R.A. (2008). The European Union as Party to International Agreements: 
Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities. In A. Dashwood & M. Maresceau 
(Eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing 
Landscape. Cambridge University Press, 145-180.
